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ABSTRACT With the rapid spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus
2 (SARS-CoV-2) that results in coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), corporate enti-
ties, federal, state, county, and city governments, universities, school districts, places
of worship, prisons, health care facilities, assisted living organizations, daycares,
homeowners, and other building owners and occupants have an opportunity to re-
duce the potential for transmission through built environment (BE)-mediated path-
ways. Over the last decade, substantial research into the presence, abundance, diver-
sity, function, and transmission of microbes in the BE has taken place and revealed
common pathogen exchange pathways and mechanisms. In this paper, we synthe-
size this microbiology of the BE research and the known information about SARS-
CoV-2 to provide actionable and achievable guidance to BE decision makers, build-
ing operators, and all indoor occupants attempting to minimize infectious disease
transmission through environmentally mediated pathways. We believe this informa-
tion is useful to corporate and public administrators and individuals responsible for
building operations and environmental services in their decision-making process
about the degree and duration of social-distancing measures during viral epidemics
and pandemics.
KEYWORDS COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2, building operations, built environment, novel
coronavirus
Increased spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)causing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infections worldwide has brought
increased attention and fears surrounding the prevention and control of SAR-CoV-2
from both the scientific community and the general public. While many of the precau-
tions typical for halting the spread of respiratory viruses are being implemented, other
less understood transmission pathways should also be considered and addressed to
reduce further spread. Environmentally mediated pathways for infection by other
pathogens have been a concern in buildings for decades, most notably in hospitals.
Substantial research into the presence, abundance, diversity, function, and transmission
of microorganisms in the built environment (BE) has taken place in recent years. This
work has revealed common pathogen exchange pathways and mechanisms that could
lend insights into potential methods to mediate the spread of SARS-CoV-2 through
BE-mediated pathways.
Coronaviruses (CoVs) most commonly cause mild illness, but they have occasionally,
in recent years, led to major outbreaks of human disease. Typically, mutations that
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cause structural changes in the coronavirus spike (S) glycoprotein enable binding to
new receptor types and permit the jump from an animal host to a human host (1)
(zoonotic transmission) and can increase the risk of large-scale outbreaks or epidemics
(2). In 2002, a novel CoV, severe acute respiratory virus (SARS), was discovered in the
Guangdong Province of China (3). SARS is a zoonotic CoV that originated in bats and
resulted in symptoms of persistent fever, chills/rigor, myalgia, malaise, dry cough,
headache, and dyspnea in humans (4). SARS had a mortality rate of 10% and was
transmitted to 8,000 people during an 8-month outbreak in 2002 to 2003 (5). Approx-
imately 10 years after SARS, another novel, highly pathogenic CoV, known as Middle
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), emerged and is also believed to
have originated from bats, with camels as the reservoir host (6). MERS-CoV was first
characterized in the Arabian Peninsula and spread to 27 countries, having a 35.6%
mortality rate in 2,220 cases (7).
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). In December 2019, SARS-CoV-2, a novel
CoV, was identified in the city of Wuhan, Hubei Province, a major transport hub of
central China. The earliest COVID-19 cases were linked to a large seafood market in
Wuhan, initially suggesting a direct food source transmission pathway (8). Since that
time, we have learned that person-to-person transmission is one of the main mecha-
nisms of COVID-19 spread (9). In the months since the identification of the initial cases,
COVID-19 has spread to 171 countries and territories, and there are approximately
215,546 confirmed cases (as of 18 March 2020). The modes of transmission have been
identified as host-to-human and human-to-human. There is preliminary evidence that
environmentally mediated transmission may be possible, specifically, that COVID-19
patients could be acquiring the virus through contact with abiotic BE surfaces (10, 11).
Epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2. The Betacoronavirus SARS-CoV-2 is a single-stranded
positive-sense enveloped RNA virus ( with a genome that is approximately 30 kb in
length (12, 13). Spike glycoproteins, the club-like extensions projecting from the cell
surface, facilitate the transfer of viral genetic material into a host cell by adhesion (14,
15) (Fig. 1). The viral genetic material is then replicated by the host cell. The infection
history of SARS-CoV-2 is believed to have begun in bats with a possible intermediate
host of pangolin (16). There are several other betacoronaviruses that occur in bats as a
primary reservoir, such as SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV (17). The manifestation of SARS-
CoV-2 in a human population occurred late in December 2019, among persons known
to frequent a seafood market (18). The first symptoms observed clinically were fever,
fatigue, and dry cough, with symptoms ranging from mild to severe (19). Currently, the
FIG 1 Structure of SARS-CoV-2 virus. (a) Artistic rendering of the structure and cross section of the
SARS-CoV-2 virus (14, 15). (b) Transmission electron micrograph of a SARS-CoV-2 virus particle isolated
from a patient and imaged at the NIH, specifically, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) Integrated Research Facility (IRF) in Fort Detrick, Maryland (93).
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protocol developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for
diagnosis (20) is a combination of clinical observation of symptoms and a positive result
for the presence of the virus using real-time PCR (rt-PCR) (21).
COVID-19 and the impact of the BE in transmission. The built environment (BE)
is the collection of environments that humans have constructed, including buildings,
cars, roads, public transport, and other human-built spaces (22). Since most humans
spend 90% of their daily lives inside the BE, it is essential to understand the potential
transmission dynamics of COVID-19 within the BE ecosystem and the human behavior,
spatial dynamics, and building operational factors that potentially promote and miti-
gate the spread and transmission of COVID-19. BEs serve as potential transmission
vectors for the spread of COVID-19 by inducing close interactions between individuals,
by containing fomites (objects or materials that are likely to carry infectious diseases),
and through viral exchange and transfer through the air (23, 24). The occupant density
in buildings, influenced by building type and program, occupancy schedule, and indoor
activity, facilitates the accrual of human-associated microorganisms (22). Higher occu-
pant density and increased indoor activity level typically increase social interaction and
connectivity through direct contact between individuals (25) as well as environmentally
mediated contact with abiotic surfaces (i.e., fomites). The original cluster of patients
were hospitalized in Wuhan, China, with respiratory distress (December 2019), and
approximately 10 days later, the same hospital facility was diagnosing patients outside
the original cohort with COVID-19. It is presumed that the number of infected patients
increased because of transmissions that potentially occurred within the hospital BE (10).
The increased exposure risk associated with high occupant density and consistent
contact was demonstrated with the COVID-19 outbreak that occurred on the Diamond
Princess cruise ship in January 2020 (26). Current estimates of the contagiousness
(known as the R0) of SARS-CoV-2, have been estimated from 1.5 to 3 (27, 28). R0 is
defined as the average number of people who will contract a disease from one
contagious person (29). For reference, measles has a famously high R0 of approximately
12 to 18 (30), and influenza (flu) has an R0 of 2 (31). However, within the confined
spaces of the BE, the R0 of SARS-CoV-2 has been estimated to be significantly higher
(estimates ranging from 5 to 14), with 700 of the 3,711 passengers on board the
Diamond Princess (19%) contracting COVID-19 during their 2-week quarantine on the
ship (26, 32). These incidents demonstrate the high transmissibility of COVID-19 as a
result of confined spaces found within the BE (33). With consideration to the spatial
layout of the cruise ship, the proximity of infected passengers to others likely had a
major role in the spread of COVID-19 (33).
As individuals move through the BE, there is direct and indirect contact with the
surfaces around them. Viral particles can be directly deposited and resuspended due to
natural airflow patterns, mechanical airflow patterns, or other sources of turbulence in
the indoor environment such as foot fall, walking, and thermal plumes from warm
human bodies (22, 34). These resuspended viral particles can then resettle back onto
fomites. When an individual makes contact with a surface, there is an exchange of
microbial life (35), including a transfer of viruses from the individual to the surface and
vice versa (36). Once infected, individuals with COVID-19 shed viral particles before,
during, and after developing symptoms (37, 38). These viral particles can then settle
onto abiotic objects in the BE and potentially serve as reservoirs for viral transmission
(18, 34, 39). Evidence suggests that fomites can potentially be contaminated with
SARS-CoV-2 particles from infected individuals through bodily secretions such as saliva
and nasal fluid, contact with soiled hands, and the settling of aerosolized viral particles
and large droplets spread via talking, sneezing, coughing, and vomiting (34, 40). A
study on environmental contamination from MERS-CoV demonstrated that nearly every
touchable surface in a hospital housing MERS-CoV patients had been contaminated
with the virus (41), and a survey of a hospital room with a quarantined COVID-19
patient demonstrated extensive environmental contamination (18, 34). Knowledge of
the transmission dynamics of COVID-19 is currently developing, but based upon studies
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of SARS and MERS-CoV, preliminary data on SARS-CoV-2, and CDC recommendations,
it seems likely that SARS-CoV-2 can potentially persist on fomites ranging from a couple
of hours to 5 days (39, 42, 43) depending on the material (43). Based upon preliminary
studies of SARS-CoV-2 survival, the virus survives longest at a relative humidity of 40%
on plastic surfaces (half-life median 15.9 h) and shortest in aerosol form (half-life
median 2.74 h) (43); however, survival in aerosol was determined at a relative hu-
midity of 65%. Based on data related to SARS and MERS, we predict that the viability
of SARS-CoV-2 in aerosol is likely longer at lower relative humidity levels. Survival of
SARS-CoV-2 at 40% relative humidity on copper (half-life median 3.4 h), cardboard
(half-life median 8.45 h), and steel (half-life median 13.1 h) collectively fall between
survival in the air and on plastic (43). However, it should be noted that there are no
documented cases thus far of a COVID-19 infection originating from a fomite. There is
preliminary data demonstrating the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in stool, indicating that
transmission can potentially occur through the fecal-oral pathway (18, 29, 34, 44). While
transmission of COVID-19 has been documented only through respiratory droplet
spread and not through deposition on fomites, steps should still be taken to clean and
disinfect all potential sources of SARS-CoV-2 under the assumption that active virus
may be transmitted by contact with these abiotic surfaces (34, 39). With an abundance
of caution, it is important to consider the possibility that the virus is transmitted
through aerosols and surfaces (45). For a conceptualization of SARS-CoV-2 deposition,
see Fig. 2.
FIG 2 Conceptualization of SARS-CoV-2 deposition. (a) Once an individual has been infected with SARS-CoV-2, viral particles accumulate in the
lungs and upper respiratory tract. (b) Droplets and aerosolized viral particles are expelled from the body through daily activities, such as coughing,
sneezing, and talking, and nonroutine events such as vomiting, and can spread to nearby surroundings and individuals (34, 40). (c and d) Viral
particles, excreted from the mouth and nose, are often found on the hands (c) and can be spread to commonly touched items (d) such as
computers, glasses, faucets, and countertops. There are currently no confirmed cases of fomite-to-human transmission, but viral particles have
been found on abiotic BE (built environment) surfaces (34, 39, 42).
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Previously, it has been confirmed that SARS can be, and is most often, transmitted
through droplets (46). Considering that SARS-CoV-2 is from a sister clade to the 2002
SARS virus (47) that is known to transmit from person-to-person, the high incidence of
observed person-to-person transmission and the rapid spread of COVID-19 throughout
the world and communities, it is accepted at this time that SARS-CoV-2 can also be
spread through droplets (13, 48). Based upon previous investigation into SARS (49),
spread through aerosolization remains a potential secondary transmission method,
especially within the BE. Mitigation of viral transmission through BE air delivery systems
is most often reliant on inline filtration media. Residential and commercial systems
typically require a minimum efficiency reporting value (MERV) of 8, which is rated to
capture 70 to 85% of particles ranging from 3.0 to 10.0 m, a strategy employed to
minimize debris and loss of efficiency impacts to cooling coils and other heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) components. Higher MERV ratings are required
to filter incoming outside air based on local outdoor particulate levels. Protective
environment (PE) rooms in hospitals require the most stringent minimum filtration
efficiency (50). A MERV of 7 (MERV-7) or greater is required as a first filter before heating
and cooling equipment, and a second high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter is
placed downstream of cooling coils and fans. HEPA filters are rated to remove at least
99.97% of particles at 0.3 m in size, representing the most penetrating particle size
(51). Most residential and commercial buildings utilize MERV-5 to MERV-11, and in
critical health care settings, MERV-13 or higher and HEPA filters are used. MERV-13
filters have the potential to remove microbes and other particles ranging from 0.3 to
10.0 m. Most viruses, including CoVs, range from 0.004 to 1.0 m (52). However,
viruses are rarely observed as individual particles, but instead are expelled from the
body already combined with water, proteins, salts, and other components as large
droplets and aerosols. Thus far, SARS-CoV-2 has been observed in aerosolized particles
in a spectrum of sizes, including 0.25 to 0.5 m (96), necessitating high efficiency
filtration techniques to reduce the transmission potential of pathogens such as SARS-
CoV-2. However, it has been found that gaps in the edges of filters in hospitals has been
a contributing factor of the failure of filtering systems to eliminate pathogens from the
shared air environment (53).
In recent years, the sharing economy has created environments and added new
components to how multiple people share the same spaces. It is possible that infec-
tious disease transmission may be impacted by this shift to the sharing economy.
Shared workspaces such as cowork environments, rooms in homes, cars, bikes, and
other elements of the BE may increase the potential for environmentally mediated
pathways of exposure and add complexity to enacting social-distancing measures. For
example, in cases where alternate modes of transportation were previously single
occupancy vehicles, these trips are now often replaced with rideshare programs or
transportation network companies, the potential for exposure may increase.
Control and mitigation efforts in the BE. The spread of COVID-19 is a rapidly
developing situation, but there are steps that can be taken, inside and outside the BE,
to help prevent the spread of disease. On an individual level, proper handwashing is a
critical component of controlling the spread of SARS-CoV-2, other coronaviruses, and
many respiratory infections (54–56). Individuals should avoid contact and spatial prox-
imity with infected persons and wash hands frequently for at least 20 s with soap and
hot water (39). Furthermore, since it is difficult to know who is infected and who is not,
the best way to avoid spread in some situations is by avoiding large gatherings of
individuals, also known as “social distancing.” At this time, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) does not recommend that asymptomatic individuals wear masks during
their everyday lives to preserve masks and materials for individuals who have been
infected with COVID-19 and for health care workers and family that will be in consistent
contact with individuals infected with COVID-19 (57). Additionally, wearing a mask can
give a false sense of security when moving throughout potentially contaminated areas,
and the incorrect handling and use of masks can increase transmission (58). However,
Minireview
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as masks become available, and while prioritizing access to masks for health care
workers that are in a higher risk environment daily, wearing a mask would be prudent.
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that airborne transmission is possible (49)
through aerosolized particles beyond six feet and that a mask would aid in preventing
infection through this route.
Since the end of January 2020, many countries have issued travel bans to prevent
person-to-person contact and particle-based transmission. These mobility restrictions
have been confirmed to help contain the spread of COVID-19 (59). Within local
communities, a variety of measures can also be taken to prevent further spread (60). As
a whole, these measures are known as non-health-care-setting social-distancing mea-
sures. These measures include closing high-occupancy areas such as schools and
workplaces. These community-level measures act to prevent disease transmission
through the same mechanisms as the worldwide travel restrictions by reducing typical
person-to-person contact, decreasing the possibility of fomite contamination by those
that are shedding viral particles, and decreasing the possibility of airborne, particle
transmission between individuals in the same room or close proximity. These decisions
are made by individuals with administrative authority over large jurisdictions, commu-
nities, or building stock and are weighed in balance with numerous factors, including
health risks and social and economic impacts. Furthermore, despite substantial social-
distancing and quarantine practices in place, specific building types and space uses are
considered critical infrastructure and essential to maintaining communities, such as
health care facilities, housing, and groceries. Better understanding of BE mediating
variables can be helpful in decision-making about whether to implement social-
distancing measures and for what duration, and to individuals responsible for building
operations and environmental services related to essential and critical infrastructure
during periods of social distancing, and all building types before and after social-
distancing measures are enacted.
Within the BE, environmental precautions that can be taken to potentially prevent
the spread of SARS-CoV-2 include chemical deactivation of viral particles on surfaces
(39). It has been demonstrated that 62 to 71% ethanol is effective at eliminating MERS,
SARS (42), and SARS-CoV-2 (34). This ethanol concentration is typical of most alcohol-
based hand sanitizers, making properly applied hand sanitizer a valuable tool against
the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in the BE. Items should be removed from sink areas to ensure
aerosolized water droplets do not carry viral particles onto commonly used items, and
countertops around sinks should be cleaned using a 10% bleach solution or an
alcohol-based cleaner on a regular basis. Again, it is important to remember that the
main and much more common spread mechanism of previous CoVs has been identified
as droplets from talking, sneezing, coughing, and vomiting than by the fecal-oral
pathway (34, 38, 39). Administrators and building operators should post signage about
the effectiveness of handwashing for at least 20 s with soap and hot water, ensure soap
dispensers are full, provide access to alcohol-based hand sanitizer, and implement
routine surface cleaning protocols to high-touch surfaces where contamination risks
are high, such as around sinks and toilets (39). Most importantly, to prevent the
transmission of microbes and thus, undesirable pathogens, it is important to exercise
proper handwashing hygiene (39, 61).
Enacting enhanced building HVAC operational practices can also reduce the poten-
tial for spread of SARS-CoV-2. Viruses are frequently found associated with larger
particles (e.g., complexes with water, proteins, salts, etc.) in a range of sizes. Even
though some of these particles have been identified in sizes that could potentially
penetrate high efficiency filters, ventilation and filtration remain important in reducing
the transmission potential of SARS-CoV-2. Proper filter installation and maintenance can
help reduce the risk of airborne transmission, but it is important to understand that
filters should not be assumed to eliminate airborne transmission risk. Higher outside air
fractions and higher air exchange rates in buildings may help to dilute the indoor
contaminants, including viral particles, from air that is breathed within the BE. Higher
outside air fractions may be achieved by further opening outside air damper positions
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on air-handling units, thus exhausting a higher ratio of indoor air and any airborne viral
particles present (62). There are some cautions to consider relative to these building
operations parameters. First, increasing outside air fractions may come with increased
energy consumption. In the short term, this is a worthwhile mitigation technique to
support human health, but building operators are urged to revert to normal ratios after
the period of risk has passed. Second, not all air-handling systems have the capacity to
substantially increase outside air ratios, and those that do may require a more frequent
filter maintenance protocol. Third, increasing airflow rates that simply increase the
delivery of recirculated indoor air, without increased outside air fraction, could poten-
tially increase the transmission potential. Higher airflow rates could increase resuspen-
sion from fomites and increase the potential for contamination throughout the building
by distributing indoor air more quickly, at higher velocities and volumes, potentially
resuspending more ultrafine particles (62). Additionally, increasing the indoor air
circulation rate could increase the human exposure to viable airborne viral particles
shed from other building occupants. Administrators and building operators should
collaborate to determine whether increased outside air fractions are possible, what
limitations or secondary implications must be considered, and determine a plan around
managing the outside air fraction and air change rates.
Increasing evidence indicates that humidity can play a role in the survival of
membrane-bound viruses, such as SARS-CoV-2 (63–65). Previous research has found
that, at typical indoor temperatures, relative humidity (RH) above 40% is detrimental to
the survival of many viruses, including CoVs in general (63, 66, 67), and higher indoor
RH has been shown to reduce infectious influenza virus in simulated coughs (67). Based
upon studies of other viruses, including CoVs, higher RH also decreases airborne
dispersal by maintaining larger droplets that contain viral particles, thus causing them
to deposit onto room surfaces more quickly (63, 68, 69). Higher humidity likely
negatively impacts lipid-enveloped viruses, like CoVs, through interactions with the
polar membrane heads that lead to conformational changes of the membrane, causing
disruption and inactivation of the virus (70, 71). Furthermore, changes in humidity can
impact how susceptible an individual is to infection by viral particles (72) and how far
into the respiratory tract viral particles are likely to deposit (68). Decreased RH has been
demonstrated to decrease mucociliary clearance of invading pathogens and weakened
innate immune response (72–74). However, RH above 80% may begin to promote mold
growth, inducing potentially detrimental health effects (75). Although the current
ventilation standard adopted by health care and residential care facilities, ASHRAE
170-2017, permits a wider range of RH from 20% to 60%, maintaining a RH between
40% and 60% indoors may help to limit the spread and survival of SARS-CoV-2 within
the BE, while minimizing the risk of mold growth and maintaining hydrated and intact
mucosal barriers of human occupants (50, 67). Indoor humidification is not common in
most HVAC system designs, largely due to equipment cost and maintenance concerns
related to the risk of overhumidification increasing the potential of mold growth. While
administrators and building operators should consider the costs, merits, and risks of
implementing central humidification, especially during new construction or as a retro-
fit, it may be too time intensive to implement in response to a specific viral outbreak
or episode. In addition, increased RH may lead to increased buildup on filters, decreas-
ing airflow. However, in pandemic situations, this practice likely increases the effec-
tiveness of capturing viral particles, and this benefit outweighs the increased filter
maintenance required. Therefore, targeted in-room humidification is another option to
consider, and this may reduce the likelihood of a maintenance oversight causing
overhumidification.
Building ventilation source and distribution path length can affect the composition
of indoor microbial communities. Ventilating a building by introducing air directly
through the perimeter of buildings into adjacent spaces is a strategy that does not rely
on the efficacy of whole-building filtration to prevent network distribution of micro-
organisms. Delivering outside air directly through the envelope into an adjacent spatial
volume has been shown to increase the phylogenetic diversity of indoor bacterial and
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fungal communities and create communities that are more similar to outdoor-
associated microbes than air delivered through a centralized HVAC system (76). In some
buildings, a similar approach can be accomplished through distributed HVAC units,
such as packaged terminal air-conditioners (PTAC) frequently found in hotels, motels,
senior housing facilities, condominium units, and apartments or through perimeter
passive ventilation strategies such as perimeter dampered vents (77, 78). However, for
most buildings, the easiest way to deliver outside air directly across the building
envelope is to open a window. Window ventilation not only bypasses ductwork but
increases outside air fraction and increases total air change rate as well (79). Adminis-
trators and building operators should discuss a plan for increasing perimeter, and
specifically window, ventilation when outdoor temperatures are adequate for this
practice. Care should be taken to avoid exposing occupants to extreme temperature
profiles, and caution should be taken where close proximity would promote potential
viral transfer from one residence to another (94, 95).
Light is another mitigation strategy for controlling the viability of some infectious
agents indoors. Daylight, a ubiquitous and defining element in architecture, has been
shown in microcosm studies to shape indoor bacterial communities in household dust
to be less human associated than in dark spaces (80). Moreover, daylight in both the UV
and visible spectral ranges reduced the viability of bacteria compared to dark controls
in these microcosm spaces (80). In a study simulating sunlight on influenza virus
aerosols, virus half-life was significantly reduced from 31.6 min in the dark control
group to approximately 2.4 min in simulated sunlight (81). In buildings, much of the
sunlight spectrum is filtered through architectural window glass, and the resulting
transmitted UV is largely absorbed by finishes and not reflected deeper into the space.
Therefore, further research is needed to understand the impact of natural light on
SARS-CoV-2 indoors; however, in the interim, daylight exists as a free, widely available
resource to building occupants with little downside to its use and many documented
positive human health benefits (80–83). Administrators and building operators should
encourage blinds and shades to be opened when they are not needed to actively
manage glare, privacy, or other occupant comfort factors to admit abundant daylight
and sunlight.
While daylight’s effect on indoor viruses and SARS-CoV-2 is still unexplored, spec-
trally tuned electric lighting is already implemented as engineering controls for disin-
fection indoors. UV light in the region of shorter wavelengths (254-nm UV C [UVC]) is
particularly germicidal, and fixtures tuned to this part of the light spectrum are
effectively employed in clinical settings to inactivate infectious aerosols and can reduce
the ability of some viruses to survive (84). It is important to note that most UVC light
is eliminated in the atmosphere, while much of the UVA and UVB spectrum is elimi-
nated through building glass layers. Airborne viruses that contain single-stranded RNA
(ssRNA) are reduced by 90% with a low dose of UV light, and the UV dose requirement
increases for ssRNA viruses found on surfaces (85, 86). A previous study demonstrated
that 10 min of UVC light inactivated 99.999% of CoVs tested, SARS-CoV, and MERS-CoV
(87). However, UV germicidal irradiation (UVGI) has potential safety concerns if the
room occupants are exposed to high-energy light. For this reason, UVGI is safely
installed in mechanical ventilation paths or in upper-room applications to indirectly
treat air through convective air movement (88, 89). More recently, far-UVC light in the
207- to 222-nm range has been demonstrated to effectively inactivate airborne aero-
solized viruses. While preliminary findings from in vivo rodent models and in vitro
three-dimensional (3-D) human skin models appear favorable to not cause damage to
human skin and eyes (90, 91), further research must be conducted to verify the margin
of safety before implementation. If implemented safely, UVC and UVGI light offers a
range of potential disinfectant strategies for buildings and is a common strategy for
deep clean practices in health care settings. Implementing targeted UVC and UVGI
treatment may be prudent in other space types where individuals that tested positive
for COVID-19 were known occupants, but routine treatment may have unintended
consequences and should be implemented with appropriate precaution.
Minireview
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Spatial configuration of buildings can encourage or discourage social interactions. In
recent years, Western society has valued design that emphasizes visual transparency
and a feeling of “spaciousness” indoors, whether at home through the use of open plan
concepts or at workplaces that harness open office concepts with spatial layouts that
intentionally direct occupants to nodes of “chance encounters,” thought to enhance
collaboration and innovation among employees. While these spatial configurations are
culturally important, they may inadvertently enhance opportunities for transmission of
viruses through designed human interaction. For example, large, densely populated
open office spaces may increase connectivity while private offices may decrease
connectivity. Space syntax analysis demonstrates a relationship between spatial dispo-
sition and degrees of connectivity (Fig. 3) and has been shown to correlate with the
abundance and diversity of microbes within a given space (92). Understanding these
spatial concepts could be part of the decision-making process of whether to implement
social-distancing measures, to what extent to limit occupant density, and for how long
to implement the measures.
Special considerations for health care settings for current and future epidem-
ics. Hospitals present unique challenges during the process of mitigating and protect-
ing all inhabitants from an infectious disease outbreak. Not only do health care and
hospital facilities have limited options for social-distancing measures to prevent infec-
tious spread, but health care facilities also often cohouse patients with vastly different
requirements from the BE around them. For example, high-risk immunocompromised
patients are often kept within protective environment (PE) rooms, designed to limit
outside airborne infectious agents from entering into the room. To do this, these rooms
are positively pressurized, relative to the corridor space, with a minimum of HEPA
supply air (ASHRAE 170-2017 [50]). However, this pressurization differential also in-
creases the likelihood that aerosols in the patient room will migrate outside of the PE
room and into the higher traffic corridor space when the door is open. While PE rooms
typically function as intended for the occupant, if an immunocompromised patient is
also under treatment for an airborne infectious disease, the process of limiting patho-
gen ingress into the room could potentially create involuntary exposure to health care
workers, other patients, and visitors via the corridor space. In comparison, airborne
infection isolation (AII) rooms utilize a negative pressure differential relative to the
FIG 3 Spatial connectivity, highlighting betweenness and connectance of common room and door configurations. (a)
Circles and lines follow the classic network representation. (b) The rectangles follow the architectural translation of
networks. Shaded areas correspond to a measure of betweenness (the number of shortest paths between all pairs of
spaces that pass through a given space over the sum of all shortest paths between all pairs of spaces in the building),
degree (the number of connections a space has to other spaces between any two spaces), and connectance (the number
of doors between any two spaces). (c) The arrows represent possible directions of microbial spread as determined by the
layout of the BE. (d) The circles represent the current knowledge of microbial spread based on microbial abundance
through BEs as determined by layout. Darker colors represent higher microbial abundance, and lighter colors represent
lower microbial abundance.
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corridor space and adjacent rooms, directly exhausting room air to the exterior of the
building to contain aerosolized pathogens from spreading into circulation and shared
spaces. The same negative pressure that aids in preventing spread of aerosolized
pathogens from inside the room can involuntarily expose the room occupants to
airborne pathogens that are sourced from occupants of the corridor space. Both PE and
AII rooms may be designed with an anteroom that is used as an additional buffer
between common areas and protected spaces to prevent pathogen spread and provide
a location for hospital staff to apply and remove personal protection equipment (PPE).
However, anterooms are not required for PE or AII rooms and have drawbacks during
routine operation; therefore, they exist in only some facilities. They use significant
additional floor area, create more travel distance. and increase the visual barrier
between patient and rounding care team, therefore, increase costs. These trade-offs
might be reconsidered in future design and operational protocols given the high costs
of pandemics and the critical role of health care environments during these times.
A discussion of PE and AII rooms does not adequately address the majority of
patient rooms within a hospital or health care facility that are not inherently designed
with airborne respiratory viruses in mind. Renewed consideration should be given to
general facility design to fulfill various requirements for different patient conditions and
operational requirements during both routine conditions and disease outbreaks. One
such consideration includes separating the means of thermal space conditioning from
ventilation provisions. Decoupling these functions permits decentralized mechanical or
passive ventilation systems integrated into multifunctional facades with heat recovery
and 100% outside air delivery. Mechanically delivering air through the facade would
permit all patient rooms to be operated in isolation and individually adjusted to be
positively or negatively pressurized, depending on patient requirements, with a higher
degree of operational resilience. Furthermore, future designs should reconsider the
best way to triage and complete initial assessment of patients that present symptoms
related to airborne viruses to minimize exposure to areas with other patient types if
possible. In planning for the future, architects, designers, building operators, and health
care administrators should aspire for hospital designs that can accommodate periods of
enhanced social distancing and minimize connectance and flow between common
areas, while also affording flexibility for efficient use of space during normal operating
conditions.
Conclusion. The number of individuals who have contracted COVID-19 or have
been exposed to SARS-CoV-2 has been increasing dramatically. Over a decade of
microbiology of the BE research has been reviewed to provide the most up-to-date
knowledge into the control and mediation of common pathogen exchange pathways
and mechanisms in the BE with as much specificity to SARS-CoV-2 as possible. We hope
this information can help to inform the decisions and infection control mechanisms
that are implemented by corporate entities, federal, state, county, and city govern-
ments, universities, school districts, places of worship, prisons, health care facilities,
assisted living organizations, daycares, homeowners, and other building owners and
occupants to reduce the potential for transmission through BE mediated pathways. This
information is useful to corporate and public administrators and individuals responsible
for building design and operation in their decision-making process about the degree
and duration of social-distancing measures during viral epidemics and pandemics.
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Note Added after Publication
After original publication of this paper, several changes were required and have been
made in this version of the article.
The text on page 5, first paragraph, line 18, originally read as follows: “HEPAfilters are
rated to remove at least 99.97% of particles down to 0.3 m (51). Most residential and
commercial buildings utilize MERV-5 to MERV-11, and in critical health care settings,
MERV-12 or higher and HEPA filters are used. MERV-13 filters have the potential to
removemicrobes and other particles ranging from 0.3 to 10.0m.Most viruses, includ-
ing CoVs, range from 0.004 to 1.0 m, limiting the effectiveness of these filtration
techniques against pathogens such as SARS-CoV-2 (52). Furthermore, no filter system is
perfect. Recently,. . . .”
The text on page 6, third full paragraph, second sentence, originally read as follows:
“Even though viral particles are too small to be contained by even the best HEPA and
MERV filters, ventilation precautions can be taken to ensure theminimization of SARS-
CoV-2 spread.”
The first sentence of Acknowledgments originally said: “We thank Jason Stenson and
Cassandra Moseley for comments on the manuscript.”
Reference 96 has been added to this version.
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